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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eugene Ray Cobell appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts and the proceedings in
Cobell's underlying criminal case and appeal as follows:
Cobell, a seventy-two-year-old man, was visiting the home of
his niece and his grandniece, a twenty-year-old woman. One
evening, after the other members of the family went to bed, Cobell
and his grandniece remained on the couch. The grandniece fell
asleep with her head on Cobell's shoulder and was awakened by
Cobell fondling and kissing her. When she sat up alarmed, Cobell
forced her to the ground, removed her clothing, performed oral sex
on her, penetrated her with his penis, and digitally penetrated her
anus while pulling her head back by her pony tail. The victim
reported the incident to her mother. When her mother confronted
Cobell, he initially responded that he did not do anything and later
admitted that he and the victim were just being friendly but that he
could not have raped her because he was impotent. The police
were called and an officer asked Cobell some preliminary
questions. After some vague responses, Cobell eventually told the
officer that he had his arm around the victim, she fell asleep and he
kissed her on the neck. He denied any sexual contact with the
victim.
Cobell was charged with rape, I.C. § 18-6101, and
penetration by a foreign object, I.C. § 18-6608. At trial, the victim
testified that Cobell sexually assaulted her. However, Cobell
testified that the entire encounter was consensual and began with a
kiss which then escalated to more passionate behavior. The jury
found Cobell guilty of both charges. The district court sentenced
Cobell to concurrent unified terms of life, with minimum periods of
confinement of ten years.
State v. Cobell, Docket No. 35410, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 77, pp.1-2
(Idaho App., December 2, 2009).
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On appeal, in addition to arguing an excessive sentence, Cobell asserted
his "Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was violated when the prosecutor
cross-examined him concerning his failure to relate to the victim's family and
police officers on the night of the assault the version of events to which he
testified at trial," as well claiming prosecutor misconduct by "using his postMiranda silence during cross-examination and further commenting on [his]

silence and misstating the evidence during closing evidence."

kl

at 2-8. The

Court of Appeals found the district court erred by allowing the state to question
Cobell regarding his post-Miranda silence at the police station, but such error
was harmless.

kl at

10. The court further found any errors in the state's closing

argument failed to rise to the level of fundamental error.

kl

Finally, the Court of

Appeals found Cobell "failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to concurrent unified life sentences, with minimum
periods of confinement of ten years, for the crimes of rape and penetration by a
foreign object" and affirmed Cobell's judgment of conviction and sentences.

kL.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings
Cobell filed an initial petition for post-conviction relief that was dismissed
by the district court and not appealed by Cobell. (R., pp.4, 22-23, 27.) Cobell
filed a pro se second petition for post-conviction relief, initiating the present
case.

(R., pp.3-20.)

In the petition he asserted a claim of actual innocence

based on his claimed inability to commit the crimes in question because of a
medical condition. (Id.) He also asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for
not "effectively fil[ing] the first [petition for post-conviction relief]."
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(R., p.15.)

The state filed an objection and motion to dismiss Cobell's second petition for
post-conviction relief.

(R., pp.22-26.)

The state contended Cobell was not

entitled to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief because Cobell had
failed to assert "any reason why the grounds for relief were not raised in the first
application." (R., p.25.)
The district court filed a notice of intent to summarily dismiss Cobell's
successive petition for post-conviction relief providing Cobell with the statutory 20
days to assert sufficient reason for failure to assert his grounds for relief in his
initial petition for post-conviction relief.

(R., pp.27-28.)

The district court

determined Cobell's only argument to support his position that his claims were
not adequately raised in his initial petition for post-conviction relief was that his
counsel was ineffective, failing to make any showing why his claims were not
previously raised. (R., pp.27-28.) Cobell filed a response to the state's motion to
dismiss wherein he merely restated his arguments from his successive petition
for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.29-31.) The district court summarily dismissed
Cobell's successive petition for post-conviction relief, finding Cobell had failed to
show "sufficient reason that the claims in his petition were not earlier raised."
(R., p.32.)
Cobell timely appeals from the order dismissing his petition. (R., pp.3437.)
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ISSUE
Cobell states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Cobell's
successive petition for post-conviction relief?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Cobell failed to establish the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Cobell Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Successive
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

A

Introduction
The district court summarily dismissed Cobell's successive petition for

post-conviction relief after concluding Cobell failed to make any showing why his
claims were not previously raised. (R., pp.27-28.) On appeal, Cobell asserts his
claim for ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel was properly
presented in his successive petition for post-conviction relief and the district court
erred in summarily dismissing it. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.)
Cobell's argument fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001 ).

On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).
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C.

Dismissal Of Cobell's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Was
Appropriate Because It Was Untimely Filed And Cobell Failed To Allege
Facts That, If True. Would Overcome The Successive Petition Bar And
Entitle Him To Post-Conviction Relief
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the

burden of establishing, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

However, a petition for post-conviction

relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P.
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. 1..9.:. (citing I.C. § 194903).

Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application

must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application
for post-conviction relief when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine
issue of material fact, which if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
applicant to the requested relief.

Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861, 863, 979

P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892
P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), a district court
may dismiss a post-conviction application on the motion of any party when it
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appears that the applicant is not entitled to relief. Specifically, I.C. § 19-4906(c)
provides:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Applying these principles in this case, the district court summarily
dismissed Cobell's petition. Contrary to Cobell's assertions on appeal, a review
of the record and the applicable law supports the district court's order of
summary dismissal.
1. Cobell's Successive Petition Was Untimely
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be
commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later."

In the

case of successive petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid
application of I.C. § 19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims
which simply are not known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise
important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 220 P.3d
1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d
870, 874 (2007)).

In those circumstances, the court will apply a "reasonable

time" standard. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070. "In determining
what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, [the court] will simply
consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases."
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Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. However, absent a showing by
the petitioner that the limitation period should be tolled, the failure to file a timely
petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the petition. Rhoades,
148 Idaho at 247, 220 P.3d at 1066.
Cobell's successive petition was filed July 28, 2011, more than one year
after the issuance of the Remittitur in Cobell's direct appeal.

Cobell does not

argue that his claims were not known to him or could not reasonably have been
known to him in the requisite time-frame for filing his initial post-conviction
petition.

Further, there is nothing in this record to indicate what issues were

actually raised in Cobell's first petition for post-conviction relief; it was apparently
summarily dismissed and such dismissal was not appealed.

(R., pp.22-23.)

Instead, Cobell makes only a blanket, unsupported claim that he was "effected
[sic] by other fiduciary misconduct" of his counsel below. (R., p.18.) Because
Cobell failed to justify the untimely filing his successive petition, he has failed to
show that the district court erred in dismissing his successive petition.

2. Cobell's Petition For Post-Conviction
Successive Petition

Relief Was An

Improper

Cobell asserts on appeal that the district court incorrectly concluded "that
an allegation of effective [sic] assistance of post-conviction counsel was not a
sufficient reason to raise claims in a successive petition," and he is therefore
entitled to have his case remanded for further proceedings. (Appellant's brief,
p.10.) Although the district court did not expressly acknowledge that ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel is a potential ground for asserting
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previously dismissed claims in a successive petition (R., pp.27-28), Co bell's
mere claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective was insufficient to
withstand summary dismissal.

In analyzing the situation before it, the district

court correctly recognized that it had to find a sufficient reason asserted by
Cobell for why the claims asserted in a successive petition were not raised in an
initial petition. (Id.)

The district court then concluded that Cobell had failed to

make any showing why his claims were not previously raised except to say that
his post-conviction counsel was ineffective:
All ground for relief must be raised in a petitioner's "original,
supplemental, or amended application." I.C. § 19-4908. Any
grounds not so raised "may not be the basis for a subsequent
application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which
for sufficient reason was not asserted." Thus, the Court must be
able to find sufficient reason that a ground was not raised in an
initial post-conviction petition for a successive petition to be filed.
Furthermore, "[w]hen a court is satisfied, on the basis of the
application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant
is not entitled to post-conviction relief . . . it may indicate its
intention to dismiss the application. I.C. § 19-4906(b). However,
on giving such notice, the court must give the applicant twenty (20)
days in which to respond to the proposed dismissal. Id.
Here, the petitioner's sole argument that his claims were not
adequately raised in his initial post conviction petition is that his
post-conviction counsel was ineffective. However, because there is
no right to post-conviction counsel, a petition based on
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel is without merit. (citation
omitted.) Because the petitioner has not made any showing why
the [sic] his claims were not previously raised, the Court cannot
consider this petition.
(R., pp.27-28.)
The state filed a brief in support of its objection to the filing of Cobell's
successive petition for post-conviction relief and moved for its dismissal on the

9

correct legal basis that Cobell had failed to allege "any reason why grounds for
relief were not raised in the first application." (R., p.25.) The court gave Cobell
the statutory time to show "sufficient reason that the claims in his petition were
not earlier raised." (R., p.32.) Cobell responded to the state's brief and motion
to dismiss but failed to include any reasons for his failure to allege his claims in
his first petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.29-32.) Noting that Cobell had
once again failed to "show[ ] sufficient reason that the claims in his petition were
not earlier raised," the district court dismissed his successive petition for postconviction relief. (R., p.32.)
Cobell does not assert on appeal that he had insufficient notice that his
successive petition for post-conviction relief would be summarily dismissed for
failure to show a sufficient reason his claims were not raised in his initial petition,
instead he argues he is entitled to relief because the district court misstated the
law.

(Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.)

Cobell's position appears to be all that is

required to avoid summary dismissal of a successive petition for post-conviction
relief is the mere statement that post-conviction counsel was ineffective. (See
Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.)

However, it is clear such an unsupported assertion is

not sufficient to withstand summary dismissal. Idaho Code § 19-4908 governs
the filing of successive petitions and provides:
Waiver of or failure to assert claims. - All grounds for relief
available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his
original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally
adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction
or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent application,
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for
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sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in
the original, supplemental, or amended application.
I.C. § 19-4908. In interpreting this statute, Idaho's appellate courts have held
that "[i]neffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may provide
sufficient reason for permitting newly asserted allegations or allegations
inadequately raised in the initial application to be raised in a subsequent postconviction application." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400,
403 (Ct. App. 2008) (footnote omitted) (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591,
596, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992
P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999)). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
however, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both that (a) his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(b) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687-88 (1984).
Although Cobell argues "[t]he law is clear that the ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel is just such a 'sufficient reason' for the petitioner to reraise claims through successive petitions for post-conviction relief" (Appellant's
brief, p.10), a review of the record shows that Cobell failed to make even a prima
facie showing of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to establish a
"sufficient reason" to justify the filing of his successive petition in this case.
There is nothing in the record indicating what was contained within the initial
petition for post-conviction relief and Cobell's claim of ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel consists of his unsupported statement that "he was not
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given a fair and just opportunity to present his first (habeus) [sic] U.P.C.P.A.,
because he lacked notice, and was effected by other fiduciary misconduct." (R.,
p.18.)

The record thus supports the district court's determination that Cobell

failed to show sufficient reason why the claims in his successive petition for postconviction relief were not earlier raised.
Because Cobell did have notice that his successive petition for postconviction relief would be dismissed for failure to show his claims were not
addressed in his initial petition and the opportunity to respond, the district court
correctly summarily dismissed his petition. Applying free review over the district
court's application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, Evensiosky.
136 Idaho at 190, 30 P.3d at 968, shows that the record supports the district
court's finding that Cobell failed to give sufficient reason for the filing of a
successive petition for post-conviction relief and therefore the summary
dismissal of Cobell's successive petition was not in error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Cobell's successive petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 31st day of July 2012.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of July 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
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JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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